selling guns and ammunition to natives vanished when Mohawk warriors began to offer beaver pelts worth 240 guilders in return for a musket and a pound of powder. With the beginnings of the Dutch firearms trade to the Iroquois in the 1640s, the Five Nations became the most feared Indians in the Northeast.[83]

What followed was, in proportion to the populations involved, the most widespread and destructive warfare in North American history. Because they occurred principally among native peoples, these conflicts barely rate a mention in most American history textbooks; they do not, indeed, have a consistent name. Early chroniclers called them the Wars of the Iroquois; historians now refer to them most often as the Beaver Wars because one of the principal objects of Iroquois raiding was to acquire pelts for trade. The motives of the Five Nations were in fact far more complex than that name would imply. More than a means to acquire weapons, the raids that gained so many pelts were a desperate attempt to support dwindling populations.[84]

Between the 1640s and 1667, Five Nations warriors made war on no fewer than fifty-one other native peoples,[85] conquering and depopulating large areas of the Great Lakes basin and the Ohio River Valley. In 1649–51, Iroquois warriors annihilated, scattered, or absorbed the Hurons, Petuns, and Neutrals living in an arc north and west of Lake Ontario and also the Algonquins of the Ottawa River Valley. By 1657, they had visited the same fate on the Eries, south of the lake whose name (and little more) witnesses that they once existed; simultaneously they attacked the Susquehannocks, a powerful Iroquoian people who lived in the Susquehanna Valley. These groups were particularly inviting targets because most were linguistically and culturally related to the Five Nations. But the demand for captives was so great that the Iroquois attacked virtually any group they could reach, including the French, among whom they killed or captured nearly 300 colonists before 1666. They could surely have extirpated New France altogether had they chosen to try.[86]

That they did not suggests that the Iroquois saw greater utility in allowing trading posts like those that Champlain built at Lachine and Richelieu Island to remain in operation as lures to attract western Indians with canoeloads of furs. At least until the end of the 1650s, the Five Nations retained the ability to make war or peace with the French as it suited them: one truce they observed with the French between 1653 and 1658 seems mainly to have been intended to allow them to carry on raids more effectively against "virtually every Indian people in the Northeast." By 1661–62, Iroquois raiders were attacking "Abenakis [in] New England, Algonquians [in] the Subarctic, Siouans [on] the Upper Mississippi, and various Indians near Virginia, as well as enemies closer to home."[87]

The need for captives sustained the Beaver Wars, while the demand for furs to trade for Dutch muskets and ammunition extended them further and further afield. These factors also limited the capacity of the Iroquois to carry on the fight. The perpetual influx of captives diminished Iroquois cultural coherence. Though the captors could control the external behavior of adoptees, they remained unable to effect permanent changes in religious identity and similarly deep-seated beliefs. Meanwhile, Iroquois military successes produced not only corpses and captives, but refugees—thousands of whom fled to the protection of more distant nations or coalesced into multiethnic villages and coalitions. Such displaced groups as the Wyandots (as the remnants of the Huron people were known) and the threatened Algonquian- and Siouan-speaking nations of the interior, eventually established communities in the region west of Lake Michigan and south of Lake Superior. There they forged an alliance with the French as a means of acquiring the weapons and other trade goods they needed to survive. Then, with French encouragement, they gradually reestablished themselves on lands that Iroquois attacks had emptied.

The depopulation of vast stretches of eastern North America; the destruction of thousands of native lives; the disappearance of whole cultural groups, some of which we know only by name, if that: these, too, were Champlain's legacy. Had he lived to see the devastation take place, he could scarcely have understood that such vast consequences could follow from his desire to trade with *les sauvages,* to bring the light of the gospel among them, and to increase the power and wealth of his king and nation. Ultimately, the willingness of Champlain's successors to follow his example in seeking alliance with the peoples of the interior served to restabilize, across the whole of the northeastern woodlands, the balance of power that the Iroquois-Dutch partnership had profoundly disordered. It also permanently marked the character of relations between the French and Indians.

No European colonizer was ever more successful than the French in dealing with the Indians on terms that Indians found acceptable. Such successes depended on French willingness to comply with their allies' expectations, especially by marrying into Indian families, mediating disputes among Indian groups, and engaging in continuous diplomacy, evangelization, and trade. By assuming the role of Father as understood by the Algonquian-speaking Indians who made up the bulk of France's allies—that is, by acting as a reconciler of individuals and groups in conflict, a giver of

gifts and sponsor of rituals that could compensate for injuries and losses and thus avoid further resort to violence—French imperial representatives gave their native allies a center of connection and direction they had never had before. These activities contributed to a heavy drain on the French treasury and made New France a fabulously unprofitable colonizing venture. Yet they also created what has been called a "middle ground": the geographical region west of Lake Michigan that became the homeland of the refugee peoples fleeing the Iroquois and also a metaphorical cultural zone that depended not on the dominance of Europeans over Indians, but on cooperation between them on terms acceptable to both. On the basis of this Franco-Indian alliance and the cultural accommodation that sustained it, the native peoples of the interior managed increasingly well to resist Iroquois attacks.[88]

The Beaver Wars began tapering off in 1665, when the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida nations made peace with the French. They finally concluded in 1667 when the Mohawks—always the best-armed, and always the most closely tied to the Dutch—joined in the peace. The precipitating cause of the treaties of 1665 and 1667 was England's conquest of New Netherland, which occurred as a consequence of a European commercial conflict, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–67). The abrupt transformation of the old Dutch colony into New York marked the beginning of a major, protracted, and profoundly important change in the fortunes of the Iroquois League.

The Anomalous English Empire

Even as the Beaver Wars raged throughout the Northeast and the Great Lakes basin, the new English settlements along the eastern seaboard were flourishing without becoming enthusiastic participants, on the French model, in indigenous systems of trade and war. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of the English effort to build an empire in North America was their comparative reluctance to forge military alliances with native groups. Between 1607 and the late 1640s, England's colonies in North America remained restricted to the littoral of the Chesapeake Bay, where tobacco growing came to dominate economic life, and to areas around Massachusetts Bay and Long Island Sound, which lacked a dominant staple and thus developed a more diverse economy based on farming, fishing, shipbuilding, and seaborne commerce. In neither region did colonists seek out close ties

to Indians, much less to create alliances like the ones that Champlain built up in New France. The result was an anomalous empire, built more in opposition to than cooperation with native peoples.

Disease offers a partial explanation. Terrible epidemics devastated native populations in the areas of English settlement between 1616 and 1618, about a decade after the first settlers arrived in Virginia, two years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, and a decade before the Great Migration brought thousands of Puritans to New England. As much as 75 percent of the Indian population of southern New England had died off before the *Mayflower* dropped anchor. In such a context it becomes possible to see the celebrated receptiveness of the Pokanoket chief Massasoit to the Pilgrims as less a sign of friendliness than desperation, for his remnant band badly needed an ally to help them resist domination by their western neighbors, the Narragansetts, who had yet to suffer from epidemic disease.[89] It is also possible to understand why, especially in New England, settlers regarded Indians as relatively inconsequential.

Important as these early epidemics were in explaining the relative lack of English interest in developing ties with the Indians, an even greater source of indifference came from attitudes and expectations developed in Ireland, England's first colony. There the distinctive model of the English "plantation" had emerged in the previous century, along with the attitudes that accompanied colonization. The colonial plantations of Ireland were, quite literally, small transplantations of English society onto Irish soil, in enclaves created by driving out or destroying the native population. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ireland proved a notoriously refractory domain, and the Irish were so much given to resistance and rebellion that English rule could be enforced only by repeated military interventions. Indeed, after more than a century of English colonization, the Irish were truly subjugated only in 1649–50 when Oliver Cromwell led the New Model Army in a brutal campaign of reconquest following a great rebellion, then followed up by confiscating millions of acres of land and expelling, deporting, or enslaving tens of thousands of natives.[90]

Understanding the attempt to replicate English society on lands cleared of their previous inhabitants as the model for colonization helps to explain aggressive behavior in England's earliest American settlements that is otherwise hard to fathom. Small in numbers and weak as they were, the colonists of Roanoke in 1585 (one of England's earliest attempts at permanent settlement, in what is now North Carolina), preferred extorting food from the local Algonquian Indians over seeking to make friends with them. The

Indians promptly withdrew from the region, leaving the colonists no choice but to abandon the colony. When Jamestown was founded two decades later, the settlers were once again less interested in trading for food with the numerous and powerful Powhatan confederacy than in simply taking it by force. Jamestown barely survived the resulting war. Unlike Champlain's eager search for an alliance with the natives, early English settlers were too much in the thrall of Ireland's example to conceive of accommodation as an approach to colonization.

Following initial attempts by the Indians to mount a military resistance—the Virginia Indian War of 1622–24, New England's Pequot War in 1636–37, and the Second Virginia Indian War of 1644–46—peace between English and native groups came to depend upon the willingness of Indians to sell or cede lands to the colonists. The thirty years' peace that followed the conclusion of these early conflicts depended explicitly on these land transfers, which to a substantial degree presumed the physical separation of indigenous and colonizing peoples. Because New England and the tobacco colonies of the Chesapeake (unlike Spanish, French, and Dutch settlements) rapidly developed substantial farming populations, and most of all because their stocks of cattle, pigs, and other domestic animals grew at a geometric rate, an insatiable hunger for land became a defining feature of English colonization.[91]

From the very earliest phases of settlement, then, English colonizers followed a path that led more toward apartheid than cultural engagement with native peoples.[92] Physical separation and land cessions produced more than a generation of peaceful coexistence between the English colonists and their Indian neighbors, but the founding of new colonies in the 1660s, 1670s, and 1680s, together with the mushrooming growth of human and livestock populations among the colonizers, generated demands for land that Indians could no longer satisfy without surrendering their autonomy wholesale. The renewal of Indian resistance in turn produced a new round of wars: Metacom's (King Philip's) War of 1675–76 in New England and the simultaneous Susquehannock War in the Chesapeake, which in turn triggered the Virginia insurrection of 1676, Bacon's Rebellion. These intensely destructive conflicts succeeded in excluding Indians from or subjugating them within the limits of English settlements. Apart from a paltry fur trade and some limited missionary activity in the Indian "praying towns" of Massachusetts, there was comparatively little close, continuing, and cooperative interaction between native and English groups, nothing even remotely comparable to the rate of intercultural exchange in New France and New Netherland.

Anglo-Indian warfare in the seventeenth century in part reflected the patterns of intercultural conflict in Ireland, but it also grew out of the colonists' ignorance of native cultures and martial skills, which a closer relationship with Indians might have fostered. Lacking the woodcraft to engage Indian warriors directly, the English had little choice but to attack Indian population centers and to destroy food supplies instead. "Battles" like the destruction of the Pequots' Mystic River fort on May 23, 1637, in which an English force set fire to a stockade filled with women, children, and old men, became the preferred English mode of combat. The early success of such tactics helped overcome an already weak set of English cultural proscriptions against the indiscriminate killing of "savage" or "heathen" enemies. It also stunted the willingness and the ability of the English to learn Indian tactics and techniques of mobile warfare.

Moreover, Anglo-American colonists seldom distinguished carefully among different Indian peoples, so in times of war they tended to attack all Indians, including those who had previously been friendly. Since success in wars against the natives opened up access to lands to which the English could claim by right of conquest, there was little practical advantage in developing cooperative ties with or intimate knowledge of Indian nations. Even in wartime, when the English desperately needed scouts and warriors to help their militiamen locate the enemy and avoid ambush, the colonists tended to prefer recruiting Indian auxiliaries from subjugated groups to trying to work out alliances with independent peoples.[93]

The logic of intercultural alliance encouraged French and Spanish colonizers to try to understand the variety of Indian peoples and cultures, and both proved more willing than the English to adopt the tactics of the native groups with whom they dealt directly. The French in particular proved amenable to Indian influences. After the crown took direct control of New France in the reign of Louis XIV and assigned responsibility for the colony to the Ministry of Marine, the task of defense passed to a cadre of professional soldiers, the Troupes de la Marine, who learned techniques of raid and surprise from the Indians and practiced them with a skill second only to native warriors. To a more modest degree, even the militiamen of New France—ordinary colonists who could be called out to defend the colony—understood and employed Indian-style tactics. Together with the assiduous maintenance of alliances, the successful adaptations of Canadians to Indian warmaking enabled New France to withstand Anglo-American assaults in the imperial wars of the first half of the eighteenth century and to keep the expansionist New Englanders mainly on the defensive.[94]

These very different approaches to intercultural relations influenced not only the ability of Europeans to exploit Indians but also Indian modes of resistance and cultural interaction. This manifested itself most notably in that pan-Indian movements seldom or never appeared among peoples who lacked sustained contact with the English; native groups, it seems, learned best what they had in common from dealing with colonizers who took few pains to distinguish one Indian from another. The earliest known attempt to organize a general resistance to English colonization occurred in the aftermath of the Pequot War, when in 1642 the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi—a former ally whose faith in the English was shattered when he witnessed the massacre of the Pequots at the Mystic River fort—crossed the sound to Long Island to implore the Montauks to join his people and other nations in a general alliance against the English:

> For so are we all Indians as the English are, and say brother to one another; so must we be one as they are, otherwise we shall all be gone shortly. . . . [For] these English having gotten our land, they with scythes cut down the grass, and with axes fell the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass, and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved.[95]

Miantonomi's proposal—to kill the English but keep their livestock to eat until the deer came back—did not win over the Montauk leaders, and Miantonomi indeed died at the hands of another Indian chief, the Mohegan sachem Uncas, the following year. Similarly, in 1676 the Wampanoag leader Metacom (King Philip) tried to create a generalized Indian resistance among New England's various peoples. He succeeded in attracting support from Pocassets, Nipmucks, Narragansetts, and Indians from the Connecticut Valley and brought devastation to the frontiers of three colonies as a result. The refusal of the Mohawks to join in attacking the New Englanders, however, and their decision to pursue their self-interest by attacking the Wampanoags instead, brought about the disintegration of Metacom's coalition and ultimately caused his defeat.

That the Mohawks cooperated with the English against the Wampanoags in 1676 indicated both a shift in the balance of power and an adjustment of English attitudes toward Indian alliances that had begun in the mid-1660s. Although the fundamental pattern of English intrusion, Indian resistance, and Indian exclusion persisted through the nineteenth century, England's conquest of New Netherland in 1664 added an element of complexity to

the picture, as the English effectively inherited a connection to the Iroquois League from the Dutch. This alliance, the Covenant Chain, proved enormously important for the development of the British empire in North America in the eighteenth century. It grew out of series of commercial wars between England and the Dutch Republic and the terrible disruptions that the Beaver Wars visited upon the Five Nations.

The Covenant Chain and the Origins of Iroquois Neutrality

England's emergence from the chaos of civil war allowed Parliament to respond to the intrusion of Dutch traders into England's overseas commerce in the 1650s. The first Anglo-Dutch War, 1652–54, stemmed from a law, the Navigation Act, by which Parliament forbade goods to be carried to England except in English and English colonial vessels; it was specifically aimed at the Dutch, whose merchant marine, the largest in the world, had previously carried most of England's overseas trade. This war was almost wholly naval, and successful for England in that it produced several notable victories and created a secure basis for the growth of England's own merchant marine.[96] The prospect of a new commercial war between England and the Dutch United Provinces following the Restoration prompted King Charles II to order a preemptive naval strike against the colony of New Netherland in 1664. Apart from the brief English occupation of Quebec in 1629–33 and the Dutch takeover of a tiny Swedish colony on Delaware Bay in 1655, this was the first direct confrontation between European colonizers on the North American mainland and the first removal of one colonial power by another. Conquest came easily to the English because a decade of Indian warfare in the lower Hudson Valley—the Esopus wars—had gravely weakened the Dutch colony.

Given the success of the Dutch at exploiting the Indian trade at Fort Orange, it may seem surprising that New Netherland ultimately fell victim to the effects of an Indian war. The Esopus wars, however, can be explained by New Netherland's having grown into a colony with two very different halves. Upriver, the Fort Orange traders had continued to cultivate relations with the Mohawks and other Indians in return for pelts; they had farmed only minimally, in the immediate vicinity of the fort. Downriver, the Dutch had passed through a brief initial phase of trading at New Amsterdam, then, after the upriver traders monopolized the fur supply, settled down to exploit the agricultural potential of the lower Hudson Valley and western Long Island.

By the 1650s, the downriver settlements were replicating the English pattern of expansion in human and livestock populations, and they did so in an atmosphere already poisoned by Governor Willem Kieft's efforts, beginning in 1640, to exact tribute from the natives of the lower Hudson Valley. When these bands resisted, Kieft provided muskets to the Mohawks in return for their promise to act as his allies in punishing the river Indians. Following a fierce Mohawk attack on one group in 1643, Kieft ordered the massacre of refugees who sought shelter at Pavonia, across the Hudson from New Amsterdam, and the enslavement of those who somehow escaped the slaughter. Raids and counterraids festered for five years in a conflict that rendered life increasingly miserable for the downriver Dutch and left their Indian neighbors with a thousand or more deaths to mourn.[97]

In 1645 the Dutch population of New Netherland had fallen below a thousand, and the river Indians finally forced Kieft to agree to a peace on their terms. Peace lasted only seven years, but it did provide a respite during which immigration resumed, the Dutch population grew, and farming and livestock-rearing became the economic mainstays of life along the lower Hudson. This worried the Indians, who watched the growth and bided their time until Kieft's successor as governor, Pieter Stuyvesant, took the colony's troops on an expedition to conquer New Netherland's tiny competitor, New Sweden. In mid-September 1655, the river Indians took advantage of this opportunity to launch attacks everywhere from Esopus, a hundred miles up the Hudson, to New Amsterdam itself. Fighting tapered off over the winter, only to resume three years later when settlers tried to reoccupy the deserted boweries of Esopus. It flared again in 1659, 1661, and 1663. Only in 1664, after repeatedly burning crops and villages and appealing (with limited success) to the Mohawks for help, did Stuyvesant succeed in restoring peace. By that time his colony was in such disarray that there was no question of mounting a defense when a tiny four-frigate English fleet appeared off Manhattan, carrying an expeditionary force of about three hundred soldiers. Stuyvesant surrendered the colony on September 8, 1664.[98]

New Netherland's transformation into New York undermined the ability of the Iroquois to continue the Beaver Wars, most obviously because it cut the Iroquois off from Dutch arms and ammunition just as the French-allied Indians of the middle ground were becoming increasingly well-armed, well-organized, and aggressive. Under Charles II, English foreign policy was strongly pro-French, and Westminster discountenanced the kind of unrestricted arms trade that would have allowed the Iroquois to attack New France or its allies. Finally, in 1665, the French government, having

taken over direct control of Canada, sent a full army regiment, more than a thousand strong, to the colony in the company of its first governor-general, Daniel de Rémy de Courcelle. The Carignan-Salières Regiment instantly increased the population of New France by more than a third and altered the balance of power on the frontier. The forts that the French now established on the Richelieu River–Lake Champlain corridor made it impossible for the Iroquois raiders to move freely into and out of Canada or attack at will. To demonstrate the new military might of the French, the regiment mounted an invasion of the Mohawk country in 1666 and burned four fortified towns.[99]

By this point the four western Iroquois nations had already made their peace with the French, leaving only the Mohawks to carry on the fight. Yet the Beaver Wars had exhausted them, massive adoptions had brought a great many Catholic converts and other Francophile Indians into their villages, the French had shown themselves capable of striking with great force into their heartland, and the English were uninterested in helping them to retaliate or even defend themselves. Reluctant as they were to accept peace, the Mohawks had no choice. They negotiated an end to hostilities with France and its allied peoples in 1667.

The peace settlements of 1664–67 brought a fifteen-year-long cessation in a conflict that dated from Champlain's day and created a whole new range of challenges for the Five Nations. French traders and missionaries now penetrated Iroquoia for the first time, sparking factionalism and secession as Catholic converts rejected traditionalist values in favor of those preached by the Jesuit fathers. In the mid-1670s, unrest in the Mohawk villages and a rising sense of anxiety over French influence generally had reached such a pitch that the English governor of New York, Sir Edmund Andros—a client of the Duke of York, later King James II—found it possible to forge the alliance that came to be known as the Covenant Chain. Although its immediate purposes were limited, the Covenant Chain became the foundation for all subsequent Anglo-Iroquois diplomacy, opening a new era in English approaches to Indian relations as a whole.

Andros had two pressing concerns: he hoped to enlist Iroquois aid against Metacom's Wampanoags and the other Indians who were devastating the New England frontier; he also needed their help in subduing the Susquehannocks who were simultaneously attacking colonists in the northern Chesapeake. He had a third, long-term goal as well: to assert crown authority over Anglo-Indian relations and manage intercultural diplomacy with a coherence and strategic direction that the colonies, as inveterate

competitors for advantage, could never attain on their own. The Iroquois had motives of their own for establishing the alliance. Together with the revival of a profitable (and more stable) fur trade at Albany, the Covenant Chain gave Anglophile and traditionalist factions the leverage they needed to expel Jesuit missionaries from Iroquois villages, a first step in the spiritual renewal of the Great League of Peace and Power. Beginning in about 1684, Iroquois warriors renewed the Beaver Wars, raiding the Indian allies of New France, bringing home captives for adoption as well as pelts to exchange for muskets, powder, and lead at Albany.

Meanwhile, Charles II died, and Andros's patron, the Duke of York, ascended the English throne as King James II. James assigned the indefatigable governor the task of organizing a new supercolony, the Dominion of New England, that would incorporate all the provinces north of Maryland. It was a scheme intended to impose a magisterial imperial design on the squabbling, diverse colonies of English America. But so severe was opposition in England to the Roman Catholic James and his absolutist ambitions that Parliament overthrew him in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in favor of his Protestant daughter, Mary, and her Dutch husband, William of Orange. Counterpart rebellions against James's officeholders broke out in Massachusetts and New York in 1689. As a consequence, Andros and his would-be imperial proconsuls found themselves in jail, awaiting deportation to England.

Regime change in New York and Massachusetts abruptly altered the strategic position of the Iroquois in their confrontation with the French. Two years earlier, during the summer of 1687, the governor-general of New France, the marquis de Denonville, had retaliated for the Five Nations' raids by leading more than 2,700 regulars, militiamen, and Indian allies in a massive attack on Iroquoia. While conceived on a vastly larger scale, Denonville's invasion put into effect Champlain's invasion plans of 1633 and brought great destruction to the Five Nations. They fought back with raids against French trading posts and the farming settlements of the Saint Lawrence Valley and enjoyed enough success by 1688 to force a cease-fire.

This truce might well have grown into a restoration of peace had not the Glorious Revolution suddenly changed the direction of diplomacy in Europe and America alike. England's new ruler, William III, quickly brought his kingdom into an anti-French coalition, the League of Augsburg, which commenced hostilities against Louis XIV's France in May 1689. When news of the European war arrived in the summer, Iroquois leaders sensed the potential for great gains against New France. In August the Five Nations abandoned the previous year's armistice and destroyed the farming settlement of Lachine, at the very back door of Montreal.[100]

The Five Nations decided to involve themselves in what Europeans knew as the War of the League of Augsburg and the English colonists called King William's War because they expected their Covenant Chain allies to give them the military aid that would become the basis for a renaissance of Iroquois power. They could not have made a worse miscalculation. Two Anglo-American attempts to invade Canada, in 1690 and 1691, foundered on shoals of disorganization and political factionalism in the English colonies, but not before both had brought the Five Nations into violent confrontation with their Catholic kinsmen, who had moved to missions on the Saint Lawrence in the late 1660s and early 1670s. The English proved useless to the Iroquois when the French and their allies struck Iroquoia with devastating raids. As early as 1691, the Mohawks had lost half or more of the warriors they had been able to field before the war.[101]

By 1694 the League was suffering so badly that neutralist factions in each of the Five Nations sought to make peace. They failed, and the comte de Frontenac, Denonville's successor as governor-general of New France, mobilized his middle-ground allies for new attacks. In the summer of 1696, Frontenac himself led a new invasion of the Iroquois heartland, burning crops and villages and leaving famine in his wake. Even after the Peace of Ryswick ended the War of the League of Augsburg in 1697, the French refused to cease their assaults. By 1700, between a quarter and a half of all Iroquois warriors and at least a quarter of the prewar population of Iroquoia had perished.[102]

Defeat compelled the loosely coordinated League to operate in a more coherent way as a political confederacy, and it cost the Anglophile and neutralist factions their ability to dominate Iroquois diplomacy. The result, a new influence for Francophile voices in the Great Council and their successful maneuvering for power among the confederacy's leaders, finally permitted the Five Nations to conclude simultaneous treaties at Albany and Montreal in 1701. At Montreal the Iroquois spokesmen promised to remain neutral in future wars between the French and British crowns; in return the French promised to allow free access to hunting grounds above the Great Lakes and the right to trade at the new emporium they had established in the west, Fort Detroit. At Albany the League's diplomats granted the Five Nations' claim to the Great Lakes—a claim they had asserted on the basis of their conquests in the earlier Beaver Wars—to the English crown. By 1701 that claim had become the merest fiction, but by ceding it the Iroquois

reaffirmed their relationship to the English through the Covenant Chain and placed themselves under the theoretical protection of the English monarchy.

The Grand Settlement of 1701 succeeded in its initial purpose of saving the League from annihilation. In the end, however, it did much more, for in the 1710s it became the basis of a coherent policy of Iroquois neutrality. Having suffered severely in the renewal of the Beaver Wars, then having faced extinction in King William's War and its aftermath, the Five Nations now knew better than to put their trust in an exclusive alliance with either France or Britain. Henceforth the League's best hope of survival depended on its ability to maneuver between two European empires in chronic conflict.[103]

Transformation

Eastern North America in the first year of the eighteenth century differed radically from its condition on July 30, 1609, when Samuel de Champlain leveled his overcharged arquebus at the Mohawk warriors who stood ready to fight another kind of battle. On that day, from Newfoundland to Florida, a few hundred European colonists eked out existences, as traders or fishermen or farmers, at the sufferance of native peoples who numbered more than a million. By September 1701, when the Iroquois concluded the Grand Settlement, a quarter-million Europeans lived east of the Mississippi and native populations were diminishing under the pressure of epidemics and war. In Champlain's day, Indian people eagerly embraced European trade goods in order to increase their own power; a century later, natives who had come to rely on those manufactures lived and worked within the embrace of an Atlantic economy. If in retrospect the implications of these trajectories seem unmistakable, however, it would be a mistake to imagine that contemporaries understood the future as one in which native peoples were somehow doomed to vanish from the scene.

Quite the contrary. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, nothing could have been clearer than the power of native peoples to determine historical outcomes in North America. Indians controlled the fur supply and access to land. They dictated the terms on which Europeans could travel more than a few miles beyond their settlements. Most of all, Indians wielded military power vastly disproportionate to their numbers: a few hundred warriors could disrupt the life of whole colonies at will. The destruction of Schenectady, New York; Salmon Falls, New Hampshire; and

two towns in Maine in the winter and spring of 1690 left no doubt that Indians were deadly foes—if anything, deadlier than ever.

In this sense, the final installment of Champlain's legacy was made payable a half-century after his death. The cooperative intercultural relations he established had transformed the Indians' world into a violent, disease-ridden, dangerous place. New France needed Indian allies to survive in this unstable world, for if the Indians withheld their cooperation, as they had in 1628–29, the colony was doomed. As a result, authorities in New France at the beginning of the eighteenth century attended so assiduously to the interests of their native allies that along a 2,800-mile arc from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence to the mouth of the Mississippi, Indians were acting as allies of the French, *not* against other Indians but against the English enemies of His Most Christian Majesty.

Against this Franco-Indian coalition the northern English colonies had only the battered Five Nations, bound by a Covenant Chain that effectively allowed the Iroquois to stipulate the terms and the price of their cooperation. For the next half-century the stability of North America and the welfare of its peoples reflected the creativity of Indians and colonists who accepted their places in a world structured by interactions between competing empires and learned how to exploit the needs of those imperial states to their own benefit. The fate of the Iroquois League, like that of other native groups in buffer zones between imperial spheres of influence, depended upon their ability to play empire off against empire in a diplomatic system that allowed Indians to control the balance of power. At the same time, a new Anglo-American colony, Pennsylvania—dedicated to principles that foreswore coercion and violence in dealing with Indian groups—became central to the functioning of that intricately balanced system. The founder of Pennsylvania, indeed, attempted to invert Champlain's approach to intercultural relations and make his colony a kind of laboratory to test the proposition that an empire could rest secure on relationships that were not ultimately predicated on war.

2. Address to the New York Provincial Congress, June 26, 1775, in W. W. Abbot, et al., eds., *The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series,* vol. 1, *June–September 1775* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 41.
3. Anthony Pagden, *Peoples and Empires: A Short History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest, from Greece to the Present* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), xxi.
4. Fred Anderson and Andrew R. L. Cayton, "The Problem of Fragmentation and the Prospects for Synthesis in Early American Social History," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd Ser., 50 (1993), 299–310; Andrew R. L. Cayton, "Insufficient Woe: Sense and Sensibility in Writing Nineteenth-Century History," *Reviews in American History,* 31 (2003) 3: 331–41.

One: Champlain's Legacy

1. Samuel de Champlain, "The Voyages to the Great River Saint Lawrence by the Sieur de Champlain, Captain in the Royal Navy, from the year 1608 until 1612, Book Second," in H. P. Biggar, gen. ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain,* vol. 2, *1608–1613,* trans. John Squair (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1925), 95.
2. Biographical information: Marcel Trudel, "Champlain, Samuel de," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 1, *1000 to 1700* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 186–99, and Samuel Eliot Morison, *Samuel de Champlain: Father of New France* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 16–18. On the Eighth War of Religion and its contexts: Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 524–25; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), 191–208; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41–43. On the *Saint-Julien* and its voyage: Champlain, "Brief Narrative of the Most Remarkable Things that Samuel Champlain of Brouage Observed in the West Indies," in H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain,* vol. 1, *1599–1607,* trans. H. H. Langton and W. F. Ganong (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1922), 3–7; quotation at 6–7.
3. Champlain, "Brief Narrative," *Works of Champlain,* 1:38–41, 44–45.
4. Ibid., 61–65.
5. Ross Hassig, *Mexico and the Spanish Conquest* (London: Longman, 1994), passim; Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 36–43; Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 9; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 108–14; Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York: Viking, 2001), 52–54. The most recent interpretation of the conquest places renewed emphasis on technological factors and discounts the notion that the Aztecs were made culturally vulnerable to conquest by a prophecy that identified the Spanish with the returning god Quetzalcoatl; see Camilla Townsend, "Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico," *American Historical Review* 108 (June 2003), 3:659–87.
6. Within two years after he founded Saint Augustine, Menéndez de Avilés established strategic bases at Tampa Bay and Charlotte Harbor on the west coast of the peninsula and at five locations on the east coast and to the north, from Biscayne Bay (near modern Miami) to Santa Elena (now Parris Island, in Port Royal Sound, South Carolina). By 1574, only the forts at Saint Augustine and Santa Elena remained. The Spaniards abandoned Santa Elena as indefensible in 1586, withdrawing all colonists and soldiers to Saint Augustine. See David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 70–75; Taylor, *American Colonies,* 77–79; and Steele, *Warpaths,* 25–30.
7. Steele, *Warpaths,* 25–36; quotations are from page 31. The later experience of Spain's colonization in New Mexico in many ways paralleled the history of Florida. Once again, the motivation in founding the colony was strategic. At the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish crown worried that Francis Drake's circumnavigation of the world (1578–80) indicated that he had discovered the strait of Anián, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and might therefore threaten the rich new silver mines of Chihuahua in northern Mexico. The Spanish therefore planned to found a colony near what they supposed the location of the strait to be, in what is now northern New Mexico. The Pueblos, a sedentary agricultural people along the upper Rio Grande, lived in the area. They were numerous—perhaps 50,000 in all—and prosperous and had a serious problem with the nomadic Navajos and Apaches who raided them for provisions and captives. Initially the Spanish looked like potential allies, just as they had to the Tlaxcalans and the Timucuas, and the Pueblos welcomed Governor and Captain-General Juan de Oñate when he arrived in 1598 with 400 or so soldiers, settlers, and Franciscan friars. Tribute soon became a disruptive issue, however, and when resistance emerged at Acoma Pueblo, where the Indians killed a dozen soldiers, Oñate responded by cannonading the town, killing or mutilating its men, and enslaving its women and children. The remainder of the Pueblo villages submitted quietly, receiving missionaries and paying tribute in foodstuffs and forced labor as they were commanded.

   Only in 1680 did the Spanish realize how thoroughly the Pueblos, who resented forced labor for the *encomenderos* and chafed at the missionaries' interference in their culture, had come to hate them. In that year a shaman of Tewa Pueblo named Popé succeeded in organizing an alliance of several pueblos to kill the missionaries in their villages and attack the principal Spanish settlement at Santa Fe. The uprising was phenomenally successful. Pueblo warriors killed 400 colonists and expelled the remainder together with numerous Indian converts. The refugees abandoned everything and fled 250 miles down the Rio Grande to El Paso del Norte. They did not return for twelve years; when they did, it was hardly the *reconquista* they claimed.

In the interim, the Apaches acquired horses from the herds the Spanish abandoned, learned to ride them, and began raiding the pueblos with greater ferocity and to greater effect than ever. Several pueblos had to be abandoned and their populations relocated to Santa Fe. At the same time, Popé had proved a better war leader than political unifier and the interpueblo alliance broke down. In weakness and isolation, some of the pueblos actually sought alliances with Apache groups, leaving the Pueblo people vulnerable even to civil war. Thus when a new governor-general, Diego de Vargas, tentatively returned at the head of 200 troops in 1692, the Pueblos made no effort to resist. They needed an ally with access to trade goods, weapons to help protect them from their newly formidable enemies, and a mediator to settle their internal disputes. Vargas was in reality all three of those and a conqueror only in name.

That the Pueblos could have resisted, had they chosen to do so, seems clear from the experience of the Zuñi and Hopi pueblos further west, which refused to reaccept Spanish missions and remained independent for more than a century and a half thereafter. That the Spanish realized they had "reconquered" New Mexico on sufferance from the Pueblos themselves seems clear from Vargas's refusal to reinstitute forced labor under the *encomienda* system, his hesitance to use arms to coerce the rebels, and his promotion of trade on terms as favorable as could be managed in a colony so distant from sources of supply. Missionary fathers in the postrevolt era no longer interfered so aggressively in Pueblo cultural life, tolerating the sub rosa survival of indigenous religious beliefs in return for external adherence to Catholic ritual. Most significantly, Spanish settlers participated as allies in the Pueblos' wars against Navajo, Apache, Comanche, and other enemies. The New Mexico colony became secure only when the Spanish at length controlled their desire to act as overlords and integrated themselves into an indigenous system of warfare and trade.

The wars the Pueblos and their Spanish allies fought against the Apaches, Navajos, Comanches, and other nomadic peoples became increasingly intense. In the eighteenth century, the mutual raiding for captives, livestock, and goods occasionally became severe enough to depopulate whole areas of the New Mexican frontier. To help pay the expenses of these wars, the Spanish began sending captives to Havana for sale as slaves. The Spanish crown prohibited the sale of Apache men, who were regarded as excessively dangerous, in 1800; but Apache women, and presumably other captives, continued to be sold at Havana until 1821. Thus the integration of the Spanish into the Pueblo complex of trade and war stabilized Pueblo-Spanish relations. In doing so, however, it transmuted the mutual raiding of indigenous warfare into a much more deadly and destructive form and eventually commercialized the taking of captives, transforming what had once functioned as a mechanism of demographic replacement into a procurement tool of the international slave trade.

(This account is derived from Weber, *Spanish Frontier,* 77–100, 122–41, 195–96, 204–35 passim; Robert Silverberg, *The Pueblo Revolt* [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994], 52–204; Herman J. Viola, *After Columbus* [Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 1990], 47–51, 76–83. See also Oakah L. Jones Jr., *Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966]; Andrew L. Knaut, *The Pueblo Revolt of 1680: Conquest and Resistance in Seventeenth-Century New Mexico* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995]; Elizabeth A. H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795* [College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1975]; Ramon Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991]; Jack D. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960]; Henry Warren Bowden, *American Indians and Christian Missions: Studies in Cultural Conflict* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], 53–55; Charles Hackett, ed., *Revolt of the Pueblo Indians,* 2 vols. [Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1942]; Thomas H. Naylor and Charles W. Polzer, eds., *The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain,* vol. 1: *1570–1700* [Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986]. A good recent synthesis can be found in Taylor, *American Colonies,* 79–90. The larger context of war-making, cross-cultural adoption, and enslavement in the southwestern borderlands has been most brilliantly delineated in James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002]; for this period, see esp. chaps. 1 and 2.)

8. Bruce G. Trigger and William R. Swagerty, "Entertaining Strangers: North America in the Sixteenth Century," in Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas,* vol. 1, *North America, Part 1* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 349–54.
9. Arthur J. Ray, "The Northern Interior, 1600 to Modern Times," in Bruce Trigger and Wilcomb Washburn, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas,* vol. 1, *North America, Part Two* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 267–69; Morison, *Champlain,* 25–27; Champlain, "Of Savages, or Voyage of the Sieur De Champlain Made in the Year 1603," *Works of Champlain,* 1:91.
10. Champlain and his French contemporaries distinguished the seminomadic native peoples of northern woodlands, *les sauvages* (the uncivilized), from the sedentary native inhabitants of the Spanish possessions (the Spanish Indies), whom they called *indiens,* on the basis of their modes of living. (The Spanish observed a similar distinction between *indios* and *indios bárbaros*). The habit of conflating of all native groups into a single category, Indians, was characteristic of Anglophones, who, as we shall see, saw less reason to distinguish one kind of native from another.
11. Champlain, "Of Savages," *Works of Champlain,* 1:98–109; quotations at 107–09. A note on names: the Algonquins were one of the native nations of Canada with whom Champlain had repeated dealings. Other Indian peoples, below, will be

referred to as "Algonquians"—linguistically and culturally related nations including the Algonquins, Mi'kmaqs, Malecites, Abenakis, Mahicans, Narragansetts, Delawares (Unami and Munsee), Shawnees, Fox, Ojibwas, Potawotomis, and others. Confusing as it may seem, it is necessary for narrative purposes to distinguish between the specific Algon*quins* of whom Champlain wrote and the Algon*quians* who will become important later in our story.

12. Ibid., 178–80.
13. Ibid., 110–20; quotations at 118 ("agile"), 110 ("cheerful"), 119 ("rackets" [snowshoes]), 118 ("visions"), 119–20 (sexual mores), and 111 ("revenge"); dialogue with Anadabijou, 111–17 ("approved what I had said" and "brought to be good Christians," 117). The last quotation is not H. H. Langton's translation but our own of *"ils seroient reduicts bon Chrestiens si l'on habitoit leur terres, ce qu'ils desireroient la plus part."*
14. Champlain, "The Voyages of the Sieur de Champlain of Saintonge, Captain in Ordinary for the King in the Navy," 1613, Book 1, *Works of Champlain,* 1:203–469.
15. Ibid., 384, 392–94; Morison, *Champlain,* 72, 78.
16. Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 1), *Works of Champlain,* 1:394.
17. Ibid., 395–96.
18. Ibid., 398.
19. Ibid., 399–401. On previous amicable relations with the Cape Ann Pawtuckets, see ibid., 334–42. On the identity of this group, which Champlain identified merely as Almouchiquois, see Bert Salwen, "Indians of Southern New England and Long Island: Early Period," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians,* vol. 15, *Northeast* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1978), 169–70.
20. For the identity of the Stage Harbor attackers, see Salwen, "Indians of Southern New England," 171–72. Hostile encounters with the Indians: Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 1), *Works of Champlain,* 1:400–01 (Gloucester), 416–32 (Stage Harbor).
21. Ibid., 428–29 n. 1; quotation, 431.
22. Ibid., 443, 457–58.
23. The inimical quality of competition became unmistakable on the next voyage. Champlain reached Tadoussac on June 3, 1608, trailing the fur monopoly partner François Gravé du Pont by a week. Upon arriving he learned that Gravé du Pont had tried to inform the Basques who were trading there they had no right to do so and that they had replied with violence. Gravé du Pont was wounded and one of his men was killed by a Basque crew that boarded their vessel and forcibly seized its cannon and ammunition. Asserting that "they would barter in spite of the king's orders," the Basques refused to give back the company's armaments unless Gravé du Pont returned to France. Champlain ultimately negotiated a peaceful settlement to the crisis but not without difficulty. Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 2), *Works of Champlain,* 2:11–12.

24. Champlain, "Of Savages," *Works of Champlain,* 1:129.
25. Morison, *Champlain,* 106–08; Champlain, "Voyages," (1613, Book 2), *Works of Champlain,* 2:44–58. Unlike Tadoussac, where the Montagnais population was comparatively large and sophisticated in the ways of trade, the Montagnais band at Quebec was small and poor and had probably inhabited the region for only a short time. When Cartier explored the area in 1535–36 and 1541–42, the area was home to a sizable population of Iroquoian-speaking "Stadaconans." These and the rest of the Saint Lawrence Valley's Iroquoian peoples vanished in the late sixteenth century, perhaps dispersed as a consequence of attacks by the Five Nations Iroquois. The Montagnais who lived near Quebec in 1608 were still subject to repeated Five Nations raiding, as were the Algonquins and Hurons who lived upriver. See Bruce Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans," in Trigger, ed., *Handbook,* 15:346; Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 26–40.
26. Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 2), 2:67–68. The "league" that Champlain used was *la petite lieue marine,* equivalent to approximately 2.5 nautical miles (i.e., 3.75 statute miles or 4.6 kilometers); see Morison, *Champlain,* xiii. Champlain's party met the Huron and Algonquin party opposite the island of Saint-Eloi, a little over twenty leagues (about eighty miles) from Quebec.
27. Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 2), 2:69–70.
28. Ibid., 71.
29. Ibid., 76.
30. Ibid., 79.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 85.
33. Ibid., 83–85.
34. Ibid., 86.
35. Ibid., 88–89. Our translation varies here from that of John Squair; we thank Professor Matthew Gerber for helping us to verify its accuracy.
36. Ibid., 86.
37. Ibid., 94, 95.
38. Ibid., 96.
39. Ibid., 98.
40. Ibid., 99–100. Our wording varies from that of John Squair; again, we are grateful to Matthew Gerber for his advice on the translation.
41. Ibid., 101–03.
42. Ibid., 104–05.
43. Ibid., 106.
44. Ibid., 107.
45. Ibid., 109, 110.
46. Ibid., 120–21.

47. Ibid., 121–22.
48. Ibid., 124–44.
49. Ibid., 135.
50. The foregoing list of wars was compiled from William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), and Dupuy and Dupuy, *Harper Encyclopedia of Military History.* For a comprehensive treatment of the impact of American silver on Spain and the European economic and state systems generally, see Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 3–56.
51. Parker, *Military Revolution,* chap. 1, esp. 43–44; David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 1.
52. Philip II had some idea that a naval attack on England would prove decisive but no sense of whether that would occur by naval victory in the Channel or the seizure of Ireland; nor is it clear whether he expected the result to be Elizabeth's withdrawal of support for the Dutch, the establishment of toleration for English Catholics, or the cessation of English attacks on Spanish shipping. Rather than the emergence full-blown of an integrated naval and military strategy, then, the Armada itself must be seen as a forerunner of later developments. See Kaiser, *Politics and War,* 38; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1988), 72–134.
53. Garrett Mattingly, *The Defeat of the Spanish Armada* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 354.
54. This is of course the famous formulation of the post-Napoleonic Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz. (The quotation is from *On War,* ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989], 87.) From this dictum strategic thinkers have derived a distinction between power and force on which rests the syllogism of contemporary realpolitik: that national power depends upon the ability of a state to make other states do what it wishes; that military force furnishes the ultimate means of coercion but making war diminishes a nation's capacity to continue using force; and that the prudent national leader must, therefore, resort to war sparingly as a means of achieving political goals. This understanding of policy and warfare, power and force, is extraordinarily useful in historical analysis if carefully employed, as Edward Luttwak does in *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century B.C. to the Third* (Baltimore Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), and as we try to do in the remainder of this book. We will argue, however, that its uncritical application can distort one's vision of prestate warfare systems.

    It is also worth noting that Clausewitz's insight has been more frequently invoked than carefully examined and thus has become a kind of shibboleth in strategic thinking. John Keegan has observed, for example, that the usual translation of Clausewitz's German misses much of his intended meaning: that "policy" inadequately reflects the subtler *politischen Verkehrs* ("political intercourse"), and that "by other means" similarly distorts Clausewitz's *mit Einmischung anderer Mittel* ("with the intervention of other means"). See *A History of Warfare,* 3. Keegan goes on to argue that accepting Clausewitz's definition as normative rather than as the product of specific historical circumstances has led strategic thinkers and military historians to misunderstand the character of warfare and to misconstrue its meaning in human history.

55. William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), discusses the interaction between the expansion of market behavior and values and the expansion of European power. In the eighteenth century, the money economy and the operation of market incentives made possible the mobilization of manpower and other resources at a previously unimaginable level; see esp. "The Market Asserts Control," 102–16. This development was not uncontested: "The European public, as much as European rulers of the early modern centuries, disliked and distrusted the handful of monied men who enriched themselves by constraining rulers and their subjects to conform to the dictates of the market" (116). Mercantilism thus emerged from the need to harness the energies and values of the marketplace to governmental ends. See chaps. 4 and 5 and esp. 150–51.
56. By this we mean "in the fifteenth century." Earlier on, the Mississippian cultures—invaders, perhaps conquerors, probably from Mesoamerica—had evidently fielded armies, but the decline of the Mississippian culture complex and the dispersal of its urban populations into small settlements ended this phase of development more than a century before European contact. See Richter, *Facing East,* 2–7; Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3d ser., 53 (1996), 435–58; also Francis Jennings, *The Founders of America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), and two volumes edited by Bruce D. Smith, *Mississippian Settlement Patterns* (New York: Academic Press, 1978) and *The Mississippian Emergence* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990).
57. The following is based largely on Daniel K. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), chaps. 1 and 2; Richter, *Facing East,* 62–67; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Marian W. Smith, "American Indian Warfare," New York Academy of Sciences, *Transactions,* 2d Ser., 13 (June 1951), 348–65; Jonathan Haas, ed., *The Anthropology of War* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Keith F. Otterbein, *Feuding and Warfare* (Langhorne, Pa.: Gordon and Breach, 1994), xvii–xxxii, 1–23, 33–73, 195–200; S. P. Reyna and R. E. Downs, eds., *Studying War: Anthropological Perspectives* (Langhorne, Pa.: Gordon and Breach, 1994), chaps. 1 and 2;

R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, eds., *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe, N.M.: School of American Research Press, 1992), chaps. 1 and 7; R. Brian Ferguson, ed., *Warfare, Culture, and Environment* (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984), chaps. 1, 4, and 8. Anthropologists of war currently seem to divide into two broad camps: materialists, who argue that the motives for war are rooted in competition for resources and that the result of warfare is cultural selection to magnify the values that lead to success; and sociobiologists, who agree that wars begin in competition for resources but argue for considering their effects in biological evolution and selection for aggressive traits rather than cultural selection alone. An older interpretation, which holds that warfare represents a kind of cultural imperative similar to competitive play, seems now to have fewer adherents, although both materialists and sociobiologists agree that war, once begun, depends on cultural factors for its perpetuation. This seems to grant that wars can result from previous wars, in a contingent and historically based sense that we still find persuasive.

There were two great exceptions to the generalization we make here: the Aztecs and other state or statelike systems that evolved in Mexico where armies existed and warfare took on a form extraordinarily prodigal of human life; and took on those groups in which war was either attenuated or absent: the Coast Salish, the Indians of the Columbia Plateau (the Nez Percé, Spokane, and others), the peoples of the upper Northwest Coast among whom the potlatch system prevailed (the Kwakiutl and related groups), and the Eskimos. The Aztecs and their system are discussed above. The Northwest Coast, Columbia Plateau, and Arctic peoples tended to display open aggression only at a personal level—where it could assume extreme, even "berserk" forms, especially among Eskimos—and to channel intergroup competition into ritualized forms. Eskimo song contests, Coast Salish ceremonial gamble and challenge rites, and the potlatch competitions of the northern Northwest Coast all involved groups and kin networks in supporting the contestants, and were rituals used to settle disputes that offered opportunities to gain prestige and provided a means of transferring allegiance from one leader to another. In these respects, the contests provided an alternative way to manage issues that elsewhere might trigger wars. At least in part the groups that avoided war did so by utilizing exchange relationships to channel competition into nonviolent forms. However, in settings where these otherwise pacific groups encountered warlike competitors—on the eastern edge of the Columbia Plateau where Great Plains tribes contacted plateau peoples, at fishing sites claimed by both the Coast Salish and the Nootka, or in the Subarctic zone where Eskimos and Crees came in contact—they could show a ferocity as great as any group in North America. For a description of this predominantly nonwarlike culture complex, which she identifies as "shame-aggression" to distinguish it from the "mourning-war" complex of the rest of North America north of Mexico, see

Smith, "American Indian War," esp. 350–51, 359–60, and 363–64; for a more modern interpretation, which gives larger scope to warfare even among the Kwakiutl but does not in every respect supersede Smith's general account, see R. Brian Ferguson, "A Reexamination of the Causes of Northwest Coast Warfare," in Ferguson, ed., *Warfare, Culture, and Environment,* 267–328.

58. Mourning warfare was, in cultural terms, a means of coming to terms with grief; it typically began when bereaved mothers or wives appealed to warriors to provide them with substitutes for deceased sons or husbands: captives who, at the discretion of the women, might be ritually tortured to death or tortured as a prelude to adoption. Wars allowed adolescent males to practice skills and demonstrate virtues central to their cultures, and enabled the ritual attainment of manhood; they gave grown men opportunities to gain prestige by displaying courage and distinguishing themselves with feats of arms.
59. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 35, 54; also Smith, "American Indian Warfare," 349.
60. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 29. Richter quotes an eighteenth-century Iroquois sachem: "The trade and the peace we take to be one thing" (ibid.). Compare Daniel Usner's treatment of the relationship between peace and trade in *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); and see esp. Richard White's extended analysis of trading relations, "The Fur Trade," chap. 3 of *The Middle Ground,* 94–141. White quotes the anthropologist George Dalton in analyzing an instance of exchange between Ottawas and Crees in the 1660s: "Gifts created 'peace and a sort of conditional friendship between potentially hostile persons of groups.' And precisely because 'to break off the gift giving [was] to break off the peaceful relationships,' the exchange was consciously and purposefully uneven. After giving the [beaver robes] for the European goods, the Crees made a further gift of furs to induce, or perhaps, obligate the Ottawas to return." (98–99; quoted passages are from George Dalton, "The Impact of Colonization on Aboriginal Economies in Stateless Societies," *Research in Economic Anthropology,* 1:138.)
61. Christopher L. Miller and George R. Hamell, "A New Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade," *Journal of American History* 73 (1986), 2:322: Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 28.
62. Smith, "American Indian Warfare," 349.
63. Champlain, "Voyages" (1613, Book 1), *Works of Champlain,* 1:458 n. 1.
64. The reason for the disappearance of the Saint Lawrence Iroquoians remains obscure. Cartier traded with them and lived among them at Stadacona (Quebec) in 1535–36 and 1541–43. Their disappearance may well have had something to do with those unhappy sojourns, perhaps by occasioning an intensification of war with other groups, by disease, or crop failure. For an inventive, persuasive

approach to the mystery of the Stadaconans and the Iroquoians of Hochelaga (Montreal), see Richter, *Facing East,* 28–40 passim.

65. Victor Hugo Paltsits, "Henry Hudson," *Dictionary of American Biography on CD-ROM* (New York, 1997; originally published New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932); Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), 25–28; quotation at 27.
66. Ibid., 30–35.
67. The following account of Mohawk-French-Mahican-Dutch relations in the 1620s follows Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 87–90, and Bruce G. Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624–28): The Establishment of a Pattern," *Canadian Historical Review* 52 (1971), 276–86.
68. The turning point in the Mohawk-Mahican war came in 1626, when in a reprise of Champlain's sorties against the Mohawks, the Fort Orange commissary Daniel van Krieckenbeeck and six musketeers agreed to accompany a Mahican war party in a raid against a Mohawk fort. Rather than effecting the wholesale slaughter Champlain and his allies had achieved in 1610, however, van Krieckenbeeck blundered into a Mohawk ambush. Taken wholly by surprise, he and three of his men were slain in a hail of arrows; one was roasted and eaten in a ritual feast and the body parts of others became trophies of war. Within days the Dutch sent an emissary to the Mohawks to make peace and to promise their neutrality in a contest that thereafter ran ever more decisively against the Mahicans. On van Krieckenbeeck's expedition, see Trelease, *Indian Affairs,* 46–48.
69. Seamus Heaney, trans., *Beowulf: A New Verse Translation* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), line 3009.
70. Steele, *Warpaths,* 67–68; Eccles, *France in America,* 27–29.
71. Kirke to Champlain, July 8, 1628, in Champlain, "Second Part of the Voyages of the Sieur de Champlain," Book II (1632); in H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain,* vol. 5, *1620–1629,* trans. W. D. LeSueur (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1933), 280–91.
72. Champlain to Kirke, n.d., ibid., 283–85.
73. Ibid., 240.
74. Ibid., 297–301; quotations at 299 and 301. The French did not try to hunt for themselves, evidently because the Indians would not permit it. On the one occasion that Chomina allowed Frenchmen to accompany his hunters on snowshoes, Champlain gladly furnished powder and match from his tiny stock, but the effort yielded less meat than discord. The musketeers succeeded in taking "a moose of great size" but then "devour[ed] it like ravenous wolves, without giving us any share beyond about twenty pounds." Realizing that a repeat performance of this episode might further undermine his authority and perhaps tear the French community apart altogether, Champlain "reproach[ed] them for their gluttony" and "did not send them out again, but employed them in other ways" (301).
75. Ibid., 239–65.

76. Ibid., 285–86.
77. "Second Part of the Voyages of the Sieur de Champlain," Book III, in H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain,* vol. 6, *1629–1632,* trans. W. D. LeSueur and H. H. Langton (Toronto, 1936), 8–25 (quotation at 25). Diet at Quebec in June: Morison, *Champlain,* 194.
78. Morison, *Champlain,* 199, reports the value of the 1629 exports as 300,000 *livres,* a sum equivalent to £28,846 at the average rate of exchange for *livres Tournois* on sterling in that year (John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775: A Handbook* [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978], 88 [Table 2.23]); Steele, *Warpaths,* 68, notes that the 30,000 pelts shipped in 1630 was "a record." There were apparently two reasons that the Kirkes extracted furs with greater success than Champlain. First was simply that the war, a deficit of trade goods at Quebec, and the unwillingness of the Montagnais to trade with Champlain while he held hostages had allowed a large supply to accumulate in the Indians' hands. The second factor was that, unlike Champlain, the Kirkes were willing to provide liquor to the Indians virtually without limit and hence accelerated the rate of exchange as well as increasing as the level of social disorder among natives in the vicinity of Quebec.
79. Morison, *Champlain,* 211–17; quotation at 217.
80. Ibid., 217–18; Bruce G. Trigger, "Champlain Judged by His Indian Policy: A Different View of Early Canadian History," *Anthropologica,* N.S. 13 (1971), Special Issue [*Pilot Not Commander: Essays in Memory of Diamond Jenness*]: 108; Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal and London, 1976), 2:456–57.
81. For the best explanation of Iroquois beliefs and their significance, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 30–49.
82. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 58–59; *Looking East,* 60.
83. Steele, *Warpaths,* 115; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 62, 64, 93–95; Brian J. Given, "The Iroquois Wars and Native Arms," in Bruce A. Cox, ed., *Native People, Native Lands* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 3–13; George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 165–75 (prices quoted at 170); José António Brandão, *"Your Fyre Shall Burn No More": Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 100. Iroquois—especially Mohawk—warriors had acquired as many as 300 muskets before the trade was officially sanctioned. Between 1643 and 1645, they acquired another 400 with the approval of the governor of New Netherland. This made them incomparably the best-armed native people of the eastern woodlands. All official vestiges of the ban on the firearms trade were lifted in New Netherland in 1648.
84. See esp. Brandão, *"Your Fyre Shall Burn No More,"* 6–18.
85. Ibid., 63, and Appendix D, "The Statistics of War: Iroquois Hostilities to 1701."
86. Ibid., 92–93; about half of the French in Canada were killed during the Beaver

Wars. Note that Brandão would not agree with the inference we draw here, which follows Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 64.

87. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 62 (quotation), 60–64 (dates of conquests); Steele, *Warpaths,* 117. For detailed summaries and numbers of casualties, see Brandão, *"Your Fyre Shall Burn No More,"* 72–116 and Appendix D.
88. See esp. White, *Middle Ground,* chap. 1.
89. Richter, *Facing East,* 60; Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500–1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 105–6, 114–16.
90. John O'Beirne Ranelagh, *A Short History of Ireland,* 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 43–65; also Nicholas Canny, "The Origins of Empire: An Introduction" and "England's New World and the Old, 1480s–1630s," in Canny, ed., *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century,* in Wm. Roger Louis, gen. ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1–33, 148–69; and Jane H. Ohlmeyer, "'Civilizinge of those Rude Partes': Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580s–1640s," ibid., 124–47.
91. On the importance of livestock husbandry and its unanticipated consequences for intercultural relations in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake and New England, see esp. Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
92. The analogy to the South African system is Ian Steele's; see *Warpaths,* 49.
93. The main exception to this rule can be found in Connecticut's durable alliance with the Mohegan chief Uncas; on which see Harold Selesky, *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), 3–12. This connection lasted only until the opportunistic Uncas died, in 1683 or 1684; his sons lost all freedom of action and became outright clients of the Connecticut colony. It is arguable that Uncas—who initially allied himself with the Connecticut Puritans to gain advantage over the Pequots, rivals of the Mohegans for trade with the Dutch and English—himself became an English client rather than an ally as a result of the Pequot War. In 1640 he ceded the lands on which the Mohegans' tributary peoples lived to Connecticut, in return for the colony's guarantee of his own people's land and a favored position in the wampum trade. This put the Mohegans at odds with the Narragansetts of Rhode Island, a more numerous and still-powerful people, and forced Uncas into closer, perhaps more subservient relations with the Puritans. Nevertheless, by means of accommodation he managed the considerable feat of maintaining the autonomy of his people on their lands until after King Philip's War. See Steele, *Warpaths,* 93–94; Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence,* 210–35 passim; and Michael Leroy Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
94. W. J. Eccles, "The Social, Economic, and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France," in Eccles, ed., *Essays on New France* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), 110–24. Although the Spanish experience was typically more mixed and less successful in Florida and Texas, Santa Fe and the surrounding New Mexican settlements in the eighteenth century were principally defended by young Hispanic settlers who joined Pueblo warriors in raids against their common enemy, *los indios bárbaros:* the Navajo, Apache, and Comanche nomads whose acquisition of horses and European weapons made them ever more formidable enemies. By contrast, the regular troops who had been sent to defend the frontiers meanwhile tended to remain in their *presidios.* Insofar as they contributed to the defense of the Spanish settlements, it was because individual commanders were willing to avoid confrontations and turn their forts into trading posts. See Weber, *Spanish Frontier,* 186–98, 204–15.
95. Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence,* 13 (quotation), 231–32.
96. A classic expression of mercantilism, the Navigation Act of 1651 was arguably the first English attempt to impose an imperial framework on its colonies. Following English victories at the Downs (May 1652), Portland (February 1653), North Foreland (June 1653), and Texel (July 1653), the United Provinces agreed to recognize the Navigation Act at the Treaty of Westminster, 1654, and to indemnify England for the costs of the fighting.
97. For the most perceptive available account of Kieft's War, see Evan Haefli, "Kieft's War and the Cultures of Violence in Colonial America," in Michael Bellesiles, ed., *Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 17–40.
98. On Dutch relations with the Indians of the lower Hudson Valley, see esp. Steele, *Warpaths,* 115–19; also Trelease, *Indian Affairs,* 138–74.
99. Steele, *Warpaths,* 72–75; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 105–254. Also see Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), and Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Knopf, 1984).
100. Steele, *Warpaths,* 137–40.
101. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 173.
102. Ibid., 188; Steele, *Warpaths,* 147–48.
103. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 210–13.

Two: Penn's Bargain

1. On the painting, its reception, and its relationship to *The Death of General Wolfe,* see Robert C. Alberts, *Benjamin West: A Biography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 106–12; Allen Staley, *Benjamin West: American Painter at the English Court* (Baltimore: Baltimore Museum of Art, 1989), 59–62; Ann Uhry Abrams, *The Valiant Hero: Benjamin West and Grand-Style History Painting* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 191–95; Helmut von Erffa and Allen